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Going at it alone? North Korea’s adaptability as a small power in a changing world. 
 
This article uses small states scholarship to map North Korea’s evolution from a 
post-colonial small state to a system-influencing state due to its nuclear weapons 
programme.  The framework allows for  contributions to: (1) The DPRK literature 
which in some parts has suggested the future collapse of the state, (2) The small 
states literature that suggests they can only survive if they integrate larger 
political and/or economic units, (3) The mainstream IR literature and its dominant 
Realist streak that considers great powers and their wills as the main drivers in 
contemporary world politics.  
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Introduction 
 
 
When Kim Jong Il, the former leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
(hereafter DPRK), suddenly passed away in December 2011, the country faced a rather unsure 
political future. Yet, Kim Jong Il’s son Kim Jong Un was swiftly appointed as Pyongyang’s 
new strongman and in the past few years, the DPRK has successfully tested a number of 
missiles and nuclear weapons, while the North Korean economy has slowly started to expand. 
Early in May 2016, the DPRK drew much of the world’s attention as Kim Jong Un hosted 
North Korea’s first Workers’ Party Congress in more than 35 years. Under the eager eyes of 
invited foreign journalists and in front of several thousand Communist Party cadres, Kim Jong 
Un was promoted to Party Chairman, the new position allowing him even more relative power 
over potential political yet unlikely opponents in the elite. Kim Jong Un also praised the 
country’s nuclear status and presented a new five-year economic plan to re-organize production 
up to 2020. 
 
 North Korea’s survival as a discrete entity, separate from democratic and economically 
soaring middle power South Korea, had always been an unlikely proposal. It is also one many 
Korean affairs analysts would not have been willing to wager much on. The collapse of the 
Soviet Union meant that the DPRK had to renegotiate its economic and political relationship 
with Russia, and would no longer receive Soviet economic assistance and or benefit from 
‘Soviet style unbalanced trade.’1 The DPRK was also internally fragile upon the death of its 
original founder Kim Il Sung in 1994. Crippling floods and famine in 1994 and 1998 further 
tested the DPRK’s resilience. The January 2002 Axis of Evil speech, and the subsequent 2003 
Iraq War also led many to wonder if the United States would intervene in the DPRK in a bid 
to terminate fifty years of dictatorship and political oppression. Yet, despite those less than 
auspicious conditions, the DPRK has managed to survive. This situation is somewhat 
surprising considering that the DPRK is, beyond the danger and potential instability that its 
nuclear weapons program represents, a state with extremely limited political and economic 
clout within the international system and especially within the globalized world. Though it is 
often touted as one of the most militarized countries in the world, with about a quarter of its 
GDP being spent on the military,2 quantitative indicators present a rather bleak picture. The 
DPRK has one of the world’s lowest GDPs per Capita at around $2,000. It ran a negative 
growth rate for most of the 1990s and barely reached 2% in the past decade. Its stagnating 
population of slightly over 20 million has a life expectancy of below 70.3 If the DPRK is a 
small economy, it is also small when it comes to its political interactions with the rest of the 
world. Though a member of the United Nations, and a member of the Group of 77 and the 
ASEAN Regional Forum, the closed-off nature of the North Korean regime and its economic 
system means that the bulk of its diplomatic relationships has remained with historical allies 
such as the People’s Republic of China, Russia, Cambodia, Laos, or Vietnam. Yet, those allies 
have now all departed from a centralized communist economy, leaving the DPRK to ponder 
how to survive in a globalized world.  
 
The DPRK has attracted scholarly interest because of its peculiar political system, the 
resilience of its nearly unprecedented hereditary dictatorship, the client-patron relationships it 
has maintained for several decades with the Soviet Union and the PRC, and its struggling 
economy. On the other hand, the DPRK has often been seen as an irrational and dangerous 
actor, a rogue state that ought to be sanctioned and alienated until its leadership collapses. 
While Kim Jong Il’s death might have heralded the country’s decline, Kim Jong Un now 
appears to have solidified his position via political purges, nuclear and missile launches – albeit 
not always successful – and a very visible political Congress in May 2016. Could it be that the 
DPRK is an example of a new, atypical category of small, and seemingly rather powerless 
states that, for a number of reasons, have managed to avoid collapse or absorption into a larger 
economic and political unit? Is it possible for a small state to refuse the encompassing liberal 
economic order and instead live on the margins of the institutionalized world yet still manage 
to survive and develop? The literature on small states encompasses many of the themes that 
observers of Korean affairs have been grappling with for years and has engaged some of the 
leading International Relations scholars such as Robert Keohane, Peter Katzenstein, or Robert 
Jackson.  Research agendas include how states were created following World War II and 
especially following decolonization, how small states managed the security dilemma within 
the Cold War context by either balancing or bandwagonning, how small states sought shelter 
within international institutions to counterbalance their own weaknesses, or how small states 
can provide unique and creative solutions to a globalized world.  
 
This article focuses especially on one specific argument from the small states literature: 
Olav Knudsen suggests that the small state experience is composed of stages that range from 
identity formation, state creation and achievement of security to decline, either by absorption 
within a more powerful state’s orbit, or by economic integration into a system such as the 
European Union, for example. This article applies Knudsen’s framework to the North Korean 
case and questions his last stage, decline by absorption or integration, by suggesting that for 
the DPRK, this stage could be avoided because of one specific niche power, nuclear weapons. 
There are a number of examples of small states that have disappeared or lost their independence 
in the 20th century: the German Democratic Republic was dissolved in 1990, Sikkim was an 
independent monarchy for centuries until it became part of India in 1975, the Republic of Biafra 
seceded from Nigeria in 1967 and survived for three years before it was reintegrated into its 
original state, South Vietnam existed from 1954 to 1976 as an independent communist state, 
and Tibet was an independent kingdom until it became an autonomous region of the PRC.  
Hence, considering survival and especially how to maintain independence is not a trivial 
question. By using the literature on small states , this paper first  considers North Korea as a 
contested state in the international system. It then reviews the literature on small states, and its 
shortcomings and contributions, in light of the DPRK’s own experience. Finally, it looks at the 
DPRK’s development through stages (survival, in-between great power rivalry, rejection of 
international world order and development of nuclear weapons) by ultimately presenting 
conclusions about the DPRK’s Byungjin line, a balance of military power and economic 
development as an alternate stage in small state survival strategies. By using the literature on 
small states, the paper is able to consider a more layered analysis of particular aspects of the 
DPRK and its development while avoiding the regular trappings of International Relations and 
its encompassing focus on power. It also aims to state modest albeit novel claims to the 
literature on small states by considering what happens when neither absorption nor conformity 
occurs for a state in a regional area that does not provide institutional shelter or at least where 
shelter is denied to specific states such as the DPRK.  
 
The DPRK: A Contested State 
 
Following the division of the Korean peninsula in 1945 to remove the vestiges of 
Japanese colonial structures, the DPRK was established in 1948 but has struggled to become a 
legitimate political unit. The Korean War and the subsequent 1953 armistice have left the 
country divided since then, and the two Koreas have evolved in a near-constant state of 
tension.4 This ‘mother crisis’ has led to a precarious economic situation precipitated by the 
DPRK’s domestic choices and a commitment to self-reliance under both Kim Il Sung and Kim 
Jong Il.5 Both the Republic of Korea and the DPRK were small states that became collateral 
concerns for leading Cold War powers such as Washington and Moscow. For Browning, small 
states usually retain an inability to act freely as they become entangled in conflicts and rivalries 
over the balance of power and  question of hegemony.6 The DPRK fits this pattern, as its 
economy was bolstered principally and for many years by Chinese and Soviet investments, as 
well as by a number of Eastern European countries that participated in North Korea’s 
development effort.7 As a newly decolonized state in the early 1950s, the DPRK dutifully 
supported a number of national liberation movements across the African continent but it was 
too small to adopt any balancing attitude toward the West during these times. It also did not 
really have to do so: indeed, the DPRK was in need of protectors, and its security was largely 
assured by the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union.  
 
With the South Korean economy and military was bolstered by the United States, the 
two Koreas started to compete with one another for domination over the Korean peninsula but 
also for recognition and engagement with other countries around the world, especially in other 
parts of Asia and Africa.8 This engagement phase, lasting roughly from the 1950s to the 1980s, 
was largely influenced by the Non-Aligned Movement and allowed the DPRK to develop 
alliances especially with countries fighting against colonial powers and forms of Western or 
capitalist hegemony. Thus, even if the DPRK is to be considered a small state, it has not always 
been as isolated as it often appears to be. In order to understand how these changes have come 
to be, Hey suggests that a system level of analysis is crucial to explain small states’ behavior: 
they might not be able to motivate change at the global level but this does not mean they always 
are passive.9 In this vein, the DPRK has taken a number of ‘roles’ over its six decades of 
existence, and has evolved from a post-colonial small state to an economic opportunist 
struggling to embrace globalization while at the same time retaining its independence and 
protecting its borders with a nuclear deterrent.  
 
As a result, there is an extensive amount of research that has been conducted on the 
DPRK, and that has helped us understand the country further. The bulk of research falls under 
several broad themes: (1) North Korean leading figures and inner-political workings,10 (2) 
North Korea’s socialist policies and its economic development,11 (3) Politics of divisions and 
reconciliation,12 (4) The past, war, and managing foreign military influences,13  (5) North 
Korea’s nuclear weapons development and strategic interactions,14 (6) Engagement and the 
potential fostering of bilateral and multilateral cooperation,15 (7) Human rights and human 
condition,16 (8) Propaganda and political instruments of control,17 and (9) Foreign Relations 
and Partnerships to name a few.18 Up until more recently, there was a reticence in considering 
the DPRK as a rational actor, as leading scholarship concentrated mostly on collapse 
scenarios.19 Hence, North Korean survival was not envisaged as a long-term option, its future 
was intrinsically mapped within the context of being absorbed by South Korea, and its 
proliferation behaviours not believed to be persistent-enough to yield a nuclear deterrent.  
 
Small State Literature in a North Korean Context 
 
 The literature on small states emerged essentially after World War II, and has been 
greatly influenced by historical events such as the process of decolonization. With the creation 
of a large amount of states, this new availability of data coupled with changes in behavioral 
sciences meant that in the quest to find a middle ground theory of Foreign Policy, it appeared 
possible to develop new theories about a plethora of phenomena. The literature is itself divided 
in a number of subfields, with research spanning from the concepts of recognition, self-
determination, balancing and bandwagonning, to how to contend with the globalized world, 
and especially how small states and institutions relate to one another.20 The field has soared 
with studies on European membership and how small and defenseless states needed at times to 
seek shelter from potentially threatening powers, and thus gaining protection via NATO 
membership for example.21 International relations as a discipline has been often been concern 
with classifying states according to their access to particular resources, and their ability to yield 
power. In this vein, Handel sees five discrete types of states: superpowers, great powers, middle 
powers, small powers and micro-states,22 with small states usually lacking the power and thus 
ability to influence outcomes in the international system. 23  Just as with any theory and 
benchmark, finding an appropriate, and to some extent encompassing definition of what exactly 
a small state is has occupied a large part of the literature, with a general focus on population 
indicators. In Europe, smallness is often defined at around the 15-million people mark24 while 
the World Bank defines small states as having less than 1½ million people. Part of the literature 
has also focuses on Pacific Island States because islands are rather suitable candidates to the 
small state label. Given that their geographical isolation and lack of easy territorial expansion 
opportunities mean that their own economic determinants might not be subject to much 
change.25 While islands have been legitimate candidates to small state studies, there is a 
understandable degree of variation in the literature on what small exactly means. But if one 
returns to the literature’s genesis, that is to say during the 1960s and 1970s, small states were 
considered to have around 10-15 million inhabitants26 and up to 20 or 30 million in the case of 
underdeveloped countries according to David Vital, one of the field’s pioneers. 27  The 
consensus then was that small states were also characterized by limited resources and thus a 
small economy.28 Most of today’s small states however boast solid gross national incomes and 
only qualify as potential small states because of their insularity or low population, such as 
Iceland for example.29  
 
With a population, according to the World Bank of just over 10 million in 1960 and 
figures reaching about 25 million 50 years later, the DPRK surely fit the literature’s criteria 
during the Cold War era. The political, ideological and especially geographical context North 
Korea found itself in has also limited the country’s own expansion: population flow was 
politically blocked, and there was very little easy access to the country because it is a peninsula 
and because of its closed militarized borders. Thus, the DPRK could easily be imagined as an 
island. Economic indicators however are harder to come by, especially for the Cold War period, 
but recent figures from the Bank of Korea show a GNI per capita below $1,000, placing the 
DPRK decidedly in the Low-Income Countries group. The DPRK’s experience also resonates 
with small states’ vulnerability and their need to seek shelter and protection from a specific 
alliance or states. As a former Japanese colony, Pyongyang sought support from the USSR and 
the PRC for decades in an attempt to stabilize as a solid satellite and communist ally.   
 
 The focus on the international system and environment in which small states evolve has 
also tended to eclipse their own domestic politics. This means that in many cases, elite ideas 
are not considered, as material or structural explanations are favored.30 This elimination of the 
‘black box’ model in foreign policy seems hardly appropriate when the general foreign policy 
analysis field has focused a lot of efforts for several decades on explaining this very box 
functions. That small states’ domestic conditions and governing structures be dismissed as 
irrelevant in the grand scheme of the system is problematic indeed, as it paints small states as 
helpless entities. Smallness however does not necessarily have to equate to weakness in every 
area. Some such as  Neumann have suggested weak and small states could be holding 
comparative advantages when it comes to sizable natural resources.31 Finally, security has also 
been part of the small states discussion in the 1970s, and especially nuclear weapons. There 
are disagreements regarding the effect nuclear weapons would have if small states were to hold 
them and some such as Vital have suggested that nuclear weapons would have a rather limited 
deterrent value against any great power.32  
 
The contentions arising within the small state literature eerily resonates with the 
DPRK’s situation. Despite the DPRK’s economic difficulties, natural resources are plentiful in 
the country albeit not always exploited or exploitable within the current state of 
industrialization and mechanization in the country. Contrary to what Vital suggests about the 
irrelevance of nuclear weapons as an equalizer for small states, very few could claim nowadays 
that the DPRK’s nuclear capacity is irrelevant. Experts have been divided for a number of years 
on whether DPRK weapons tests were as successful as heralded by the regime, and missile 
technology as robust as it would need to be in order for the DPRK to have a credible and usable 
nuclear deterrent weapon, ready to be launched.33 Yet, the international community, led by the 
United Nations, has created a comprehensive web of sanctions since North Korea’s first nuclear 
test in 2006 in an attempt to stop Pyongyang’s proliferation attempts, and to help manage 
nuclear facilities and materials.  If North Korea’s nuclear weapons were not conceived as 
relevant or salient-enough to threaten peace and stability, much less time and effort would have 
been monopolized to curb the DPRK’s behavior.  
 
 International Relations as a discipline has often exclusively focused on great powers 
and has sometimes dismissed smaller actors as insignificant. Yet, small states can still be 
system-affecting even though they are not necessarily able to be system-determining as stated 
by Robert Keohane in his seminal 1969 Lilliputian article.34 Four decades later, there is much 
interest in small states studies. This is because post-USSR fragmentation led to state creation, 
and new debates also arose over supranational institutions and their relations with the state-
system. As such,  new studies have reassessed the field and highlighted the need to understand 
how small states, as a variable in International Relations and the Foreign Policy field, impact 
the system.35 While a large part of the literature still focuses on how weak small states are, this 
has paved the way for the study of economic vulnerability. It has also put the spotlight on  how 
small states are often considered ‘in between’, forced to choose protection from a range of 
actors that might offer it, or having to struggle to secure shelter. While small states appeared 
to have little choice but to be dependent on either the USSR or the US during the Cold War,36 
the other ‘constellations’ or networks weak powers belong to are seen as increasingly important 
in a globalized world.37 This is particularly true for the DPRK, as it has oscillated between and 
exploited cracks within the Communist blocks during the Cold War, swaying between the 
USSR and the PRC. At the same time, the DPRK has engaged with the Non-Aligned 
Movement and retained its own domestic political independence as much as possible with the 
creation of its own brand of socialism via its Juch’e ideology. Hence, though small states have 
been understood as weak and essentially patients of the international system instead of true 
agents, they are also self-aware, especially when it comes to their potential weaknesses. Thus, 
they often are ‘outside-focused’, they pay attention to the international system, and how they 
develop strategies to cope with specific weaknesses. These strategies have increasingly been 
labelled as ‘smart’ and ‘innovative’ especially because small states might have more freedom 
and less entanglements to consider, thus allowing them to ‘fly under the radar’ and develop 
strategies that depart from the gamut of traditionally policies.38 But small states are also known 
to be vocal about ideas, given than their own resources might be more limited than others in 
the system. East has noticed already in the 1970s the propensity for small powers to make more 
use of verbal statements which allowed them to take fewer risks in light of their small 
capabilities.39  
 
More recently, Brunn has looked at how small states have used fora such as the United 
Nations to express specific views and attempt to influence the broader political agenda.40 In 
the case of the DPRK, propaganda has played an increasingly important role over the years to 
attempt to keep other countries at bay, and especially when it comes to the relationship the 
DPRK has had with its brother in arms South Korea, or the United States. Contention about 
American military presence has influenced Pyongyang in its decision to develop a nuclear 
deterrent. Hence, the DPRK has often let the world know about its nuclear weapons status, and 
how the weapons would be used as a deterrent in case North Korean sovereignty was threatened. 
As a result, it is easy to read about Pyongang’s nuclear stance and ideas via the Korea Central 
News Agency, one of North Korea’s most visible propaganda outlets, as it is published daily, 
is translated into English and is easily accessible online. In this particular light, the DPRK is 
atypical, given that most small states have, when they can, developed strategies to be relevant 
in the international system by being norm entrepreneurs and supporters of ‘good’ values. This 
has been especially true in the field of non-proliferation and denuclearization: Mongolia for 
example has declared itself a nuclear-weapon-free zone in 1992, and New Zealand has actively 
campaigned to secure other nuclear-weapon-free zones around the world.41 How one makes 
itself relevant when resources are limited has therefore been one of the areas that small state 
literature has focused on more recently. The tide has thus resolutely shifted from presenting 
states as weak and in need of protection to considering that small state status is actually 
‘survivable’ especially because it is possible, under some conditions, for small states to adapt.42  
 
The DPRK:  Atypical Development in a Connected World 
 
(1) State Establishment and Contention 
 
The DPRK is a product of both colonization and separation. These processes could be 
sufficient by themselves to explain how the DPRK has struggled to develop as a stable unit, 
but the added devastation caused by the Korean War only a few years after the establishment 
of the DPRK state in 1948 led the DPRK to need to establish itself again in the 1950s. This 
was done partly against South Korea, with both states developing different political and 
economic systems, as well with the help of the socialist world.  
 
The DPRK attempted to strengthen its own legitimacy and right to exist by weakening 
South Korea. South Korea’s 1960s protest movements were followed closely by Pyongyang,43 
and the South Korean intelligentsia was targeted to eventually induce a communist revolution 
in the South.44 Pyongyang also hoped to capitalize on the death of South Korean leader Park 
Chung Hee by isolating the ROK from the Non-Aligned Movement and instigating an 
international front against Seoul via Korean diplomatic missions abroad.45  The Kwangju 
uprisings provided another opportunity for Pyongyang to highlight the instability and 
weaknesses inherent within the South Korean system.46  
 
But the DPRK required foreign assistance to rebuid and develop, especially after the 
Korean War. A number of Eastern European countries that participated in North Korea’s 
development effort47 such as Poland, Hungary but also Eastern Germany which supported the 
reconstruction of the town of Hamhung in the late 1950s.48 Armed with a relative economic 
and industrial know-how, the DPRK started to see itself as a potential model for less-developed 
and struggling Third World countries that had become independent in the 1950s and the 1960s. 
With a head start of about a decade or two and no historical and political connection to mar a 
potential relationship, Pyongyang provided assistance to Nasser during the Suez Crisis of 1956, 
helped with the rebuilding of Addis Ababa in Ethiopia. It also supported a number of national 
liberation movements across the African continent, or what would be term ‘bandwagoning,’ 
essentially joining forces to counterbalance the established Western liberal world order.49 The 
DPRK also attempted to strengthen its own legitimacy and right to exist by weakening South 
Korea. South Korea’s 1960s protest movements were followed closely by Pyongyang,50 and 
the South Korean intelligentsia was targeted to eventually induce a communist revolution in 
the South.51 Pyongyang also hoped to capitalize on the death of South Korean leader Park 
Chung Hee by isolating the ROK from the Non-Aligned Movement and instigating an 
international front against Seoul via Korean diplomatic missions abroad.52  The Kwangju 
uprisings provided another opportunity for Pyongyang to highlight the instability and 
weaknesses inherent within the South Korean system.53  
 
(2) Being in the Middle 
 
The DPRK’s state development was bolstered by its relationship with regional powers, 
and especially the support it received from both the USSR and the PRC. Though there was an 
obvious Communist support coming from Moscow during the years following the Japanese 
occupation and the Korean partition, it is not until late 1948 that Stalin and Kim Il Sung started 
to trade telegrams and developed a personal relationship.54 Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Zhou Enlai accepted a similar overture by Pyongyang in 1949.55 Though a Communist North 
Korea had apparently joined hands with the two largest Communist countries in the world, it 
also did so for non-ideological reasons. One the one hand, the relationship between the Soviet 
Union and North Korea was based on trade and production. On the other hand the relationship 
with the People’s Republic of China was initially based on ideological affinity but carried 
border implications that were important for Beijing to manage. However, beyond the apparent 
closeness and ideological synergies and support for a Communist world and especially anti-
American visions of power the trio shared, it was at time far from being as close as ‘lips and 
teeth.’ Over the next decade, ideological discords and geopolitical concerns often rocked the 
DPRK-PRC-USSR partnership well before Gorbachev’s Perestroika reformed the Soviet world 
and Deng Xiaoping changed the nature of Chinese economic development. The death of Stalin 
in March 1953 had significant impact on the North Korean-USSR-China relationship as Nikita 
Khrushchev’s rejection of Stalin’s cult of personality led to a strand of revisionism within the 
Communist ideology. Both North Korea and China joined sides in an anti-revisionism 
movement, and the Soviet-PRC split left North Korea in a difficult position when Beijing’s 
drastic economic reforms during the Great Leap forward led to a near country collapse. During 
the 1960s, the DPRK concentrated a large part of its diplomacy on Africa, with a number of 
North Korean officials touring various countries after full diplomacy relations were established 
with Guinea in 1958, thus marking the beginning of Pyongyang’s Africa years. Pyongyang 
went on to develop relationship with more than a dozen African countries, and established a 
number of trade agreements.56 This behavior is very consistent with parts of the small state 
literature which suggests that small states often prioritize their own economic issues57 or that 
they also attempt to engage into peaceful, non-aggressive diplomatic relationships.58 
 (3) Survival in a Multilateral World 
 
Despite these engagements, the DPRK was ill-prepared to interact with the international, 
multilateral world as the Cold War ended. But United Nations Security Council Resolution 702 
recommended that both DPRK and ROK receive United Nations General Assembly 
Membership. With this decision, the Koreas’ full membership took effect on 19 September 
1991.59 As famine and drought hit the DPRK rather harshly in 1997 and 1998, many countries 
felt compelled to participate in an aid effort aimed at alleviating population suffering. From 
rice shipment to debt cancellation, aid was delivered by countries that had long-established ties 
with the DPRK, while seemingly non-traditional allies delivered aid through IGOs or NGOs. 
“Shelter” thus came in the form of aid from the DPRK’s own constellation, essentially 
countries it had developed links with over the years, as well as beyond. North Korea received 
2,000 tons of rice from Taiwan in March 1997,60  30 tons of free grain from Pakistan in 
September 1998, 61  and 1,000 tons of rice from India in 1999, 62  while Vietnam kept on 
delivering rice to Pyongyang all throughout the 2000s and beyond. 63  Long-time allied 
Mongolia sent more than thirty-five tons of goat meat directly to the DPRK after Pyongyang 
had requested aid from the United Nations early 2011.64 On the other hand, some countries 
offered conditional aid. Japanese-backed Mexican initiatives for example pledged a large crude 
oil donation in 1999 in exchange for North Korea to commit to the end of its nuclear program.65 
Israel also asked in 2000 for North Korea to agree to an arms control agreement in exchange 
for its humanitarian assistance.66 Other important contributors such as Canada, Australia or 
New Zealand, who had supported the DPRK with large donations to the World Food Program 
in the late 1990s severed their aid packages because of Pyongyang’s nuclear program 
development.67  
 
(4) Developing a Niche Nuclear Power 
 
With the United States’ Manhattan project leading to the development and eventual use 
of nuclear bombs in Japan and the USSR’s own nuclear test in 1949, Kim Il Sung expressed 
interest in having Korean scientists work in the field of nuclear research as early as the mid 
1950s.68 The introduction by the United States of nuclear weapons in South Korea in 1960 
might have swayed Pyongyang’s alleged initial peaceful intentions toward developing their 
own nuclear deterrent, especially in light of the newly-developing Sino-Soviet split.69 The main 
partner that enabled North Korea to develop nuclear weapons in the past decade has been 
Pakistan though.  Pyongyang also started to be a linchpin in the weapons trade by selling and 
trading knowledge out to Iran, Libya, Syria and Myanmar. It eventually became known that 
the Pakistani government had not directly participated in sending nuclear technology to the 
DPRK though. Instead,  one of its top nuclear scientists, Abdul Qadeer Khan, had done so. The 
DPRK’s nuclear capacities have provided the country with a credible deterrent and have been 
touted by the North Korea government and especially via KCNA as necessary to ensure the 
respect of Korean sovereignty, security and territorial integrity.  
 
The North Korean nuclear programme costs relatively little money, with estimated 
cumulative production and testing phase at about US$ 3 billion for the first two launches.70 
When compared to North Korean military expenditures over the past decades, the programme 
appears almost ridiculously cheap. North Korea’s annual military spending has ranged from 
US$ 0.68 billion in 1970 to US$ 7.84 billion in 2010, with an average yearly spending of US$ 
4.28 billion.71  With GDP figures ranging from US$17 billion to US$24 billion in 2010, 
depending on sources,72 North Korean military spending is consequent however, especially in 
light of how much investment would be needed to support more traditional sectors such as 
agriculture or manufacturing. The DPRK nuclear program has also led to sanctions: as of 2016, 
there are five United Nations Security Council Resolutions that partly constrains North Korea’s 
economy activity. There is currently little evidence available to that would support the fact that 
international sanctions have been able to curb North Korean proliferation behaviour. But 
sanctions have had effects on the ground, and on society. Indeed, while luxury-goods trade 
involving illegal activities often perpetrated by diplomats has become more difficult,73 specific 
sanction status such as being place on the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism 
has prevented the DPRK from borrowing international development funds.74.  
 
(5) Relationship with Global Governance 
 
The DPRK has taken little opportunity to speak in very public fora, and its rare 
apparitions at the United Nations General Assembly have often been used to present aggressive 
and strong anti-hegemonic statements. Cambodia, as a close partner to the DPRK given the 
personal relationship between Kim Il Sung and King Norodom Sihanouk, was tapped by the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations to examine the potential to bring Pyongyang into 
discussion within the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). North Korea’s participation to the 
ARF’s Bangkok meeting in the summer of 2000 led to a flurry of activity and engagement, 
with meetings organized with South Korea, the United States as well as Japan.75 Those still 
represent timid steps within the globalised world, and one cannot talk of the DPRK being 
integrated within the system. In the past few years, and in concert with Kim Jong Un’s ascent 
to power, the DPRK has increased its communication on the Millennium Development Goals 
and what is needed from the international community in order to meet the goals. This 
communication could have been strategized by the DPRK elite as a way to engage with the 
international community and United Nations agencies in order to receive support. The MDGs 
could potentially be used as a pretext to receive aid without admitting to its own domestic 
population that the leadership is facing difficulties. This is also a platform that has allowed the 
DPRK to voice its own views and concerns about development, environment, and especially 
about energy, resource management and conservation.  
 
At the G-77 meeting in September 2013, the DPRK talked about a changing North 
Korean outlook, with a new focus on knowledge-based economy, but reiterated the principle 
of sovereignty. Is also emphasized poorer countries’ right to develop, a point that could indeed 
question the effects of international sanctions on the general development of the DPRK. 
Essentially, the DPRK is not willing to compromise on its own vision of security and 
sovereignty as well as its weapons program development but is looking for independence on 
these matters while still seeking international support for development.76 Indeed, In 1998, the 
DPRK suggested via is newspaper Rodong Sinmun that South Korea’s attempt to attract 
foreign investments and foreign capital would most likely lead to its ruin.77  Almost two 
decades later, the DPRK has started to slowly embrace the concept of investment it had rejected 
so publicly and vehemently in the past. Changes within the DPRK society have been made 
following knowledge partnerships, exploratory missions abroad, inter-ministerial talks and the 
establishment of a number of Special Economy Zones.  A number of structural and legal 
changes have thus occurred, with for example the creation of the Economic Development 
Association in 2013, a North Korean ‘NGO’ that aims to support the establishment of foreign 
businesses, and which is reachable in Pyongyang via email and phone.78 Legal work to create 
a system supportive of international investments has started, with the Korea’s Lawyers’ 
Association developing an external civil law office that can act as a legal representative and 
provide legal services to local as well as foreign business, while mediating and arbitrating 
between entities as well if needed.79  
 
Conclusion: Investing to Create a Future 
 
 
The DPRK is no exceptional state, yet it is the only state that has managed to develop 
nuclear weapons while maintaining an often negative growth rate.80 The toll for the North 
Korean society has been tremendous: while large sums have been devoted by the state to the 
development of military technology, 81  constraints on the society that have come from 
international sanctions and alienation within the international community have greatly 
impaired the DPRK’s development. The DPRK has chosen to gamble its survival on 
developing a weapons system that has constricted its growth and nearly ensured its own 
downfall. While this is hardly a path that would be recommended for other small nations 
struggling to become independent, the DPRK’s more recent endeavours to slowly develop its 
economy, now that might have assured its survival with its nuclear deterrent. This might lend 
support to Knudsen’s concept of small state-ness being “survivable” with appropriate change. 
Yet, suggesting that the DPRK has managed to survive without shelter from either strong states 
or international institutions would be misleading. China still remains the DPRK’s largest 
trading partner, totally nearly US$6 billion in 2014.82 The DPRK has also received a large 
amount of aid via service-oriented organizations: Sweden provided more than a quarter of the 
World Food Program’s 1996 food appeal while Estonia offered €32,000 in 2008, 83 Germany 
supported the DPRK both via the WFP as well as its domestic agency German Famine Aid,84 
and France has channelled a lot of its contributions via two non-governmental organizations, 
Première Urgence Internationale and Aide Médicale Internationale, with yet more than 
€500,000 offered in 2011 alone.85  
 
Is there hope for the DPRK to ‘normalize’ and achieve Knudsen’s last ‘integration’ 
step? In recent years, some steps forward have been made. Singapore has become engaged in 
the DPRK via Maxgro Holding, which was set up as a joint venture in 2001 and gave the 
company the use of 20,000 hectares of North Korean land to cultivate paulownia, a fast-
growing hardwood.86 The North Korean outfit Sek replaced South Korean mini-major Hahn 
Shin Corporation in May 2003 as Italy’s partner for a $20 million series of animation deal, 
with Sek paying a large sum of money to acquire 30% of the Asian distribution rights to four 
biopics.87 The Kaesong project has also been successful with aluminium products88 though the 
recent zone closure, initiated by South Korea because of suspicion that Kaesong revenues were 
supporting the DPRK’s nuclear program highlights the still fickle nature of trading and 
interacting with the North.   
 
Looking at the DPRK through the lens afforded by small states literature provide new 
insights to North Korean studies, by adding credence to the increasingly more salient non-
collapist paradigm. How the DPRK manages to survive still remains a a contentious question 
though, but the North Korean case adds to the small states literature by showing added support 
for resourcefulness of seemingly weaker actors. Yet, the DPRK remains a puzzling case within 
the international relations discipline, defying realist powerplay while being far from genuinely 
engaging with the neoliberal world order. But there might be other areas in which further 
questioning of the status, role and foreign policy of North Korea would be welcomed. This 
could include scholarship on the types of security institution needed in Northeast Asia given 
proliferation. It could also include studying countries, especially in the Middle East such as 
Syria and Iran, that have been involved in weapons trade with the DPRK, or that have 
proliferated despite international sanction regimes. It is also understood that not many small 
states are in the position, nowadays, to develop a credible nuclear deterrent. In this particular 
case, the Korean case might sit at the margin of what small states can achieve. 
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